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Carter et al v. Stanton, Director, Marion County
Dept. of Public Welfare et al.
SD Ind.
app. from 3-judge dist. ct. (Kerner, Steckler and
Noland)

Timely
Facts:
(A.)

Section 406Aof the Social Security Act,
42

u.s.c.

606(a) provides in part:

{T}he term 'dependent child means a needy

cn~ld • • • who has been deprived of parental

support or care by reason of the death,
continued absence from the horne, or physical
incapacity of a parent • • • •

Indiana Board of Public Welfare Reg. 2-402(b),
Burn's Ind. Admin. Rules & Regs. Ann. Sec. 52-1001(2-b
provides:
When the continued absence is due to
desertion or separation, the aba~ce shall
have been continued for a period of at least
six(6) months prior to the date of application
for assistance to dependent children; except
that under exceptional circumstances of need
and where it is determined that the absence
of a parent is actual and bona fide an
application may be filed and ~child may be
considered immediately eligible upon a special
finding of the county department of public
welfare setting forth the facts and reasons
for such action.

Appellants are mothers who

cla~m

that their

children were rendered destitute as the result
of the desertion or separation of the father.
They assert that they applied to the Marion
County Dept. of Public Welfare and were denied
the right to complete application forms for
AFDC assistance or were denied AFDC assistance
itself, after being permitted to complete the
application, on the ground that the desertion
or separation had occurred within the previous
six months;
by

that no investigation was commenced

appellees to determine any exceptional

circumstances of need;
appeals were taken from

and that no administrative
the adverse rulings on

their attempts to secure the AFDC assistance.
Appellants filed a complaint in the USDC
under the Civil Rights Act, 42

u.s.c.

1983,

claiming that Indiana Public Welfare Reg.
2-402(b) was unconstitutional.

The three-judge

dist. ct. was convened and dismissed the complaint

vf on

the grounds that appellants had failed to

exhaust the available state administrative appeal

J

procedures and on the ground that the complaint
presented no substantial federal question.

Conception• ;
~ppellanta

atsert that the State Reg . 1s

unconstitutional because there ia no reasonable
relation beeween the six-month requirement and
the interest of the State in determining
qualification for the assistance; there is no
requirement that the State welfare officials
conduct an investigation to determine exceptional

circumstances of need and the officials are
sranted standard-leas and arbitrary discretion
to determine who is eligible to apply for the
assistance within the six-month 'eriod;

the

Indiana authorities would have granted the AFDC
within the 6-month period
assistance to appellantsAhad they been willing
to file for legal separation or divorce, and this

coercion to terminate the marital status violates
appellants 1 9th amend. right of privacy and their
c:onatitutional risht to travel (the requirements
for divorce would

~ibit

their travel to anotber

acate); and tbe aix-.onth requlr--t conflicta
with the Social Security Act becauae the lattv

•contain• no risld valtlll& period to eatabllall

• 'CGDtmuect ••••••.

Appellants maintain that the dist. ct.
had jurisdiction under 28 U.s.c. 1343(3) and(4);
that the question presentedis substantial;

and

that the action of the dist. ct. in dismissing
the complaint for failure to exhaust state
administrative remedies is directly contrary to
the decision in Damico v, California, 389

u.s.

416 (1967), 2£, Harlan dissenting (Held that where
suit was filed under the Civil Rigts Act
challenging as unconstitutional the California
welfare law and regulations, relief underfhe
Civil Rights Act may not be defeated by failure

to seek relief under available State administrative
remedy,),

Motion to Affirm:

The SG of Indiana argues that the question
presented is not substantial;

that the six-

month waiting requirement is not absolure, that
it can be bypassed by demonstrating exceptional
circumstances of need, and that the requirement
is reasonably necessary in determining
qualification for AFDC assistance because of
desertion or separation--that a father who leaves

the home for a "brief soiree" is not absent in
any "continued" sense;

that the State Reg.

does nor conflict with the federal statute
because a "continued absenceu is one which
lasts more than an instant and the State's
definition of a continued absence as one for
six months is not unreasonable and does not
violate the federal requirement to provide
assistance "with reasonable promptnesstt to all
eligible individuals;

that appellants should be

required to exhaust their State administrative
remedies for otherwise there is no case or
controversy and Damico should be distinguished
because that case dealt with the question of the
constitutionality of a State statute while this
case deals only with the question of the
constitutioality of a State regualtion .

MOtion to Dismiss or

Affirm:

Appellee Stanton argues that a claimant is
not required to file for separation or divorce
in order to receive assistance within six months

after desertion or separation, but that the filing
ia only one factor considered in determining

eligibility and need;

that absence for six

months is not a mandatory condition for
assistance;

and that KXXXM administrative

remedies must be exhausted before seeking ~tra
ordinary relief which the administrative relief
might render the judicial determination of
the issues unnecessary, Chicago Automobile
Trade Ass'n v, Madden, 328 F. 2d 766 (CA 7 1964).

Addendum:

Appellants argue that the decision below
conflicts with the following cases in

~ich

it was held that sLmilar three-month periods
for determining "continued absence" were
unlawful because they conflicte d with the
requirements of the Social Security Act:
d6, Ia,..;,. (l

Pamico v. Califo;nia, 2 Pov. L. Rep. Par.l0,478

upp. 41"-f~~..l-,-_,.1

N.D. Cal. 1969), and Doe y, Hursh, 2 Pov. L. Rep.
Par. 11, 753 (D. Minn. 1970).

Appellee Stanton

asserts that Pamico should be distinguished
because the Cal, regulation prohibited assistance
prior to the expiration of the three-month

period unl••• legal action wa• taken to terminate

